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Abstract 
 
The central purpose of this article is to demonstrate that ‘gender mainstreaming’ and ‘equality 
proofing’ procedures in British law-making are in a state of flux. It reflects on two recent 
developments that are likely to have a significant impact on how gender equality concerns are 
taken into account in law-making: the introduction of the single public sector equality duty in 
the Equality Act 2010 and the announcement in late 2012 by David Cameron that public 
authorities are no longer required to carry out ‘equality impact assessments’. Although both of 
these developments threaten to undermine the fundamental purpose of gender mainstreaming, a 
widely-endorsed equality strategy that requires all law and policy to be evaluated through a 
gendered lens, they also send conflicting messages to public authorities. Whereas the new public 
sector equality duty requires law-makers to be more aware of diversity and to take more equality 
concerns into account in law and policy making, the axing of equality impact assessments 
reflects the view that such practices are overly bureaucratic and a waste of valuable resources. 
This paradox exacerbates the lack of clarity that currently defines ‘equality proofing’ in British 
law-making and raises new and serious questions about the responsiveness of future laws to the 
needs and interests of diverse social groups.    
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In April 2011, the Equality Act 2010 came into force across Great Britain,1 replacing 
specific public sector equality duties relating to gender, disability and race with a single 
public sector equality duty.2 This new ‘general’ duty requires inter alia that public 
authorities ‘have due regard’ to the elimination of discrimination, harassment and 
victimisation3 directed at individuals with a ‘protected characteristic’4 and further that 
                                               
* PhD Candidate, School of Law, University of Aberdeen.   
1 With limited exceptions, the Act does not apply to Northern Ireland.  See Equality Act 2010, s 217.      
2 <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/People/Equality/18500/GenderEqualityIssues> accessed 23 
May 2013; Equality Act 2010, s 149.  
3 Equality Act 2010, s 149 (1) (a).  
4 Section 149 (7) of the Equality Act 2010 lists the ‘protected characteristics’. These are age, disability, 
gender reassignment, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation.   
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such authorities ‘advance equality of opportunity’ and ‘foster good relations’ ‘(...) 
between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not 
share it.’5 Approximately eighteen months after the Equality Act came into force, David 
Cameron announced that ‘equality impact assessments’ (EIAs), a tool used to evaluate 
the impact of policy and legislation on protected groups, were to be axed.6 This 
announcement appeared to send the message that the evaluation of legislation and 
policy against a standard of equality is unnecessary ‘red tape’7 rather than a necessary 
and prudent measure to ensure that British laws do not have a disparate impact on 
society’s most vulnerable groups. With respect to gender equality, Cameron’s 
announcement is in direct conflict with the concept of gender mainstreaming (‘GM’) 
which demands that ‘(...) any planned action, including legislation, policies or 
programmes, in any area and at all levels’8 be evaluated for their potential gendered 
impact.  
This article analyses the above two developments in light of the UK’s ostensible 
commitment to gender mainstreaming, paying specific attention to how and why 
gender equality concerns are currently taken into account in the law-making process. In 
order to comment upon the possible consequences of removing EIAs (themselves a tool 
of gender mainstreaming), it is necessary to first examine the arguments justifying their 
existence. After providing an overview of the concept of gender mainstreaming, part 
two of this article outlines the arguments in favour of gender mainstreaming in general 
and gender equality proofing specifically. The following part then draws attention to 
concerns that have been expressed with respect to the implementation of gender 
mainstreaming, questioning whether the axing of EIAs will in fact make a material 
difference in terms of achieving gender equality.   
The final part of this article reflects on the meaning and potential impact of the 
new public sector equality duty. It will be argued that although the new law means that 
gender is no longer singled out as requiring specific attention in policy formation and 
legislative drafting, the new duty signals a movement towards ‘diversity’ or ‘equality’ 
mainstreaming that has been recently popularised and promoted in both 
mainstreaming and feminist literature. In short, the disappearance of the gender 
equality duty from Britain’s equality law framework is not necessarily problematic from 
the perspective of those most concerned with the advancement of gender equality. The 
adoption of a single equality duty does, however, raise a wealth of new concerns that, 
coupled with the abolition of EIAs, cloak the future of equality proofing in British law-
making in a cloud of uncertainty.      
                                               
5 Equality Act 2010, s 149 (1) (b) & (c).   
6 H Mulholland, ‘David Cameron axes equality assessments in war on ‘red tape’ The Guardian (London 19 
Nov 2012) <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/nov/19/cameron-axe-equality-assessments> 
accessed 23 May 2013.    
7 ibid.  
8 This is part of the commonly–referred to definition of gender mainstreaming, coined by the UN 
Economic and Social Council in 1997.  See United Nations, Report of the Economic and Social Council for 
1997) (New York: General Assembly, A/53/3) available at 
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/52/plenary/a52-3.htm> accessed 23 May 2013.   
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2. The Argument for Mainstreaming Gender Equality in British Law & Policy-
Making 
 
A.  Gender Mainstreaming in England, Wales & Scotland 
 
To many, the notion that all law and policy should be evaluated for its gendered impact 
might sound at once controversial, overtly feminist, radical and impractical. However, 
since gender mainstreaming was formally adopted in 1995 at the UN World Conference 
on Women in Beijing,9 and by the EU in the Treaty of Amsterdam,10 this idea has been 
officially embraced and promoted on both an international and domestic level. The 
Council of Europe have offered the following justificatory rationale for the universal 
adoption of GM:11 
 
Gender mainstreaming is essential for a properly functioning democracy. It puts 
people at the heart of policy making; leads to better informed policy-making and 
therefore enhanced government; makes full use of all human resources and 
acknowledges the shared responsibilities of women and men in all spheres of 
social ordering; makes gender visible at all levels of society; and takes account of 
diversity between women and men and between women and women, men and 
men.   
 
Significantly, both the Scottish and UK Parliaments have endorsed GM as a 
‘gender equality strategy’,12 with the Scottish Executive describing equality 
mainstreaming as ‘(...) the systematic integration of an equality perspective into the 
everyday work of government, involving policy makers across all government 
departments, as well as equality specialists and external partners.’13 It is important to 
note here that although the Scotland Act reserves the power to legislate on equal 
opportunities to the UK Parliament, the Scottish Executive still has the power to 
‘encourage equal opportunities’ and impose specific duties on Scottish public 
                                               
9 O Hankivsky, ‘Gender vs. Diversity Mainstreaming: A Preliminary Examination of the Role and 
Transformative Potential of Feminist Theory’ (2005) 38:4 Canadian Journal of Political Science 977, 978. 
10 The Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, Articles 2 & 3. Kantola points out that the Council of Europe’s 2008 
definition of gender mainstreaming has been influential in the European context. See J Kantona, Gender 
and the European Union (Palgrave 2010) 127. The Council of Europe defines GM as ‘(...) the 
(re)organization, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender 
equality perspective is incorporated in all policies and all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally 
involved in policy making.’ Cited in Kantola, 127.   
11 Council of Europe, cited in C Chinkin, Gender Mainstreaming in Legal & Constitutional Affairs: A Reference 
Manual for Governments and Other Stakeholders (Commonwealth Secretariat 2001) 14. 
12 Equal opportunities and positive action are generally recognized as the two other ‘equality’ strategies. 
See R Bendl & A Schmit, ‘Gender Mainstreaming: An Assessment of Its Conceptual Value for Gender 
Equality’ (2013) 20:4 Gender, Work & Organisation 364, 364.   
13 <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/People/Equality/18507/executivemainstreaming> accessed 
Aug 2 2013.   
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authorities.14 There are therefore some key differences in the mainstreaming duties 
imposed on public bodies in Scotland and the rest of the UK. Indeed, some have 
suggested that ‘(...) the commitment to mainstreaming (...) appears to be a stronger force 
for change in the newly devolved administrations of Scotland and Wales’ due to the 
heavy involvement of women’s groups in the devolution process. As McKay et al 
explain:15    
 
The absence of a stated political commitment to gender in election manifestos 
suggests that the promotion of gender balance and gender mainstreaming in 
Scotland can be directly attributed to the lobbying and participants of women’s 
groups throughout the process towards devolution. 
 
Despite some differences in how gender mainstreaming is conceived and implemented, 
however, the fact that the fundamental equality law framework is governed by 
Westminster means that legislative change also applies in the devolved administrations 
of the UK.    
 
B. The Logic Underlying the Gender Equality Duty 
 
The foundational idea of gender mainstreaming is that state policies and laws affect 
women and men differently16 and thus have the potential to reproduce and perpetuate 
existing patterns of gender inequality. The widespread and systematic evaluation of law 
and policy (both international and domestic) for its potential differential impact on men 
and women is the core aim of GM. This aspiration is strikingly wide, but also ‘radical’17 
for, as Zalewski has noted:18  
 
(...) the generic demand [of GM] is nothing short of wholesale transformation of 
the institutions and processes of government in regard to gender, with the 
intention that this impacts on, works with, and changes the wider society and 
polity.  
 
                                               
14 <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/People/Equality/18507/govtresponsibility> accessed Aug 2 
2013. The Equality Act makes provision for specific duties to be laid down by Scottish Ministers through 
the adoption of regulations.  The Equality Act 2010 (Specific Duties) (Scotland) Regulations came into 
force in May 2012.  The regulations are available online: 
<www.legislation.gov.uk/sdsi/2012/9780111016718/contents> accessed Aug 2 2013.    
15 A McKay, R Fitzgerald, A O’Hagan & M. Gillespie, ‘Scotland: Using Political change to advance gender 
concerns’ in D Budlender & G Hewitt (eds), ‘Gender Budgets Make More Cents: Country Studies and 
Good Practice’(Commonwealth Secretariat 2002).  
16 Hankivsky (n 9) 977.   
17 M Zalewski, ‘I don’t even know what gender is’: a discussion of the connections between gender, 
gender mainstreaming and feminist theory’ (2010) 36 Review of International Studies 3, 7.   
18 ibid.   
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GM has been described ‘(...) as the most “modern” approach to gender equality’19 
insofar as it moves beyond a focus on individual rights20 towards an approach that 
challenges ‘(...) those systems, processes and norms that generate inequalities’.21 Gender 
mainstreaming might also be understood as ‘modern’ insofar as it attempts to shift the 
conceptual focus away from ‘women’s’ interests towards more ‘generic’ gender issues. 
Otherwise put, GM is not ‘supposed’ to be a strategy only for women, despite the fact 
that the concept has strong connections with the feminist movement.22 Rather, GM was 
conceived as a strategy to ensure that the needs and interests of women and men are 
evaluated and responded to in law and policy making. Indeed, some have argued that 
the focus on ‘gender’ rather than ‘women’ is a key advantage of GM;23 that the fact that 
mainstreaming is not explicitly ‘feminist’ helps to ‘(...) win broader audiences for 
gender issues’.24   
Other commentators have highlighted that, in reality, gender mainstreaming is 
often treated as if it is really about women or, to put it another way, ‘(...) that gender 
mainstreaming may not necessarily be gender-focused at all.’25 In the UK context, this is 
exemplified by the fact that the UK’s first response to the advent of GM was for the 
Ministers of Women to set up a Women’s Unit within the Department of Work and 
Pensions.26 This is likely explained by the fact that women are still framed as the 
‘problem holders’ in gender inequality discourse.27 Nevertheless, it is the introduction 
of the Gender Equality Duty (the ‘GED’) in 2006 that still stands out as the UK 
government’s most obvious and concerted effort to mainstream gender.28 Indeed, at the 
time of its introduction, the GED was heralded as the most significant legislative 
development in the area of gender equality since the Sex Discrimination Act.29 
Acknowledging the failure of an ‘individual rights’ approach, the GED placed the onus 
on public authorities to integrate gender considerations into their everyday work, 
                                               
19 M Daly, ‘Gender Mainstreaming in Theory and Practice’ (2005) 12:3 Social Politics: International Studies 
in Gender, State & Society 433, 433.   
20 Bendl & Schmit (n 12) 364. 
21 ibid. 
22 As Hankivsky has noted, ‘[f]eminist theories about engagement with the state and normative 
arguments regarding women’s oppression, subordination and inequality constitute the foundation on 
which GM is constructed’. Hankivsky (n 9) 983.  
23 E Woodward, ‘European Gender Mainstreaming: Promises and Pitfalls of Transformative Policy’ cited 
in Hankivsky (n 9) 984. 
24 Hankivsky (n 9) 984.  
25 Daly (n 19) 441.  See also Zalewski (n 17) 6, noting that gender mainstreaming has been accused of 
ignoring men and masculinity.  
26 J Veitch, ‘Looking at gender mainstreaming in the UK government’ (2006) 7:4 International Feminist 
Journal of Politics 600, 600.  Harriet Harman and Joan Ruddock were the Ministers for Women in 1997.   
27 E Lombardo & P Meier, ‘Gender Mainstreaming in the EU: Incorporating a Feminist Reading?’ (2006) 
13: 2 European Journal of Women’s Studies 151, 157.   
28 The GED was introduced by the Equality Act 2006, which amended the Sex Discrimination Act  1975.  
29 See Equality & Human Rights Commission (Scotland), Gender Equality Duty Code of Practice: Scotland 2 
available at <www.equalityhumanrights.com/.../scottish_ged_code_of_practice.doc> accessed Aug 4 
2013.  See also Zalewski (n 17) 17.   
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requiring them to publish gender equality schemes and, importantly, ‘[t]o assess the 
impact of its current and proposed policies and practices on gender equality, and to 
have due regard to the results of those impact assessments’.30 The duty applied ‘(...) to 
policy-making, service provision, employment matters, and in relation to enforcement 
or any statutory discretion and decision making.’31 It is therefore clear that the full and 
proper implementation of the GED demanded that gender equality concerns be paid 
‘due regard’ in the formulation and drafting of law and policy. A key question, of 
course, is how to measure the gender equality impact of proposed legal and policy 
changes. What exactly is involved in equality proofing and what are some of the limits 
and failures of mainstreaming gender in law-making? 
 
 
3. Mainstreaming Gender: How it Works in Practice 
 
The integration of gender equality considerations can occur at various stages in 
the law-making process and via a variety of mainstreaming ‘tools’, which include 
equality proofing procedures and gender-based analysis.32 Equality impact assessments 
form an important part of the wider process of equality proofing, however it is 
important to note that they were not legally required under the gender equality duty, 
nor are they currently required under the public sector equality duty.33 On the other 
hand, they are carried out by public authorities as a matter of good practice and serve as 
proof that public authorities have fulfilled their legal duty to pay ‘due regard’ to the 
elimination of discrimination and the promotion of equality.34 Their purpose is to ‘(...) 
expose the ‘gap’ between the assumptions on which policy has been based and the 
reality’,35 rather than to ensure blanket gender neutrality or ‘(...) that all decisions are 
“good for women”’.36 The following passage, taken from a Scottish Executive report 
that compared equality proofing procedures in different jurisdictions, contains a useful 
                                               
30 Equality & Human Rights Commission (Scotland) (n 29) 6-7.    
31 ibid 6.   
32 F Mackay & K Bilton, Equality Proofing Procedures in Drafting Legislation: International Comparisons 
(Scottish Executive Central Research Unit 2001). At 6, the report explains that these terms are often used 
interchangeably, however notes that it is more accurate to think of equality proofing ‘(...) as the formal 
framework within which impact assessment takes place.’ 
33 This matter was discussed in the case of R (Brown) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and another 
(Equality and Human Rights Commission intervening) [2008] EWHC 3158 (Admin), cited in D Pyper, ‘The 
public sector equality duty and equality impact assessments’ (Briefing Paper, House of Commons 
Library, 21 March 2013) 7 available at <www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06591> accessed Aug 6 
2013. 
34 ibid. At 17, Pyper notes that ‘(...) although the law does not require public authorities to carry out EIAs, 
the courts place significant weight on the existence of some form of documentary evidence of compliance 
with the PSED when determining judicial review cases.’ 
35 Mackay & Bilton, Equality Proofing Procedures in Drafting Legislation (n 32) 5.  
36 ibid. 
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summary of the types of issues that mainstreaming tools can expose in law and policy 
formation:37 
 
(...) flaws have been exposed in proposed policies and legislation. For example, 
gender impact assessments carried out at policy review stage in the Netherlands 
showed that a plan to restructure secondary school education which the 
designers believed to be ‘gender neutral’ would in fact reinforce gender 
segregation within the educational system. Similarly, when an analysis of a 
proposed reform of the electoral system was conducted, it showed that it would 
actually reduce the number of elected women politicians. In health care, a 
strategy which had been proposed to improve services for those suffering from 
chronic illnesses had taken as its reference point the needs and lives of young 
men, whereas in fact, most of the chronically sick are older women. 
 
The report also found that the effectiveness of GM was maximised if equality 
proofing and/or gender-based analysis were conducted at various stages, including 
policy formation, legislative drafting and scrutiny of the Bill.38 At the same time, 
however, the report suggests that the likelihood of integration is increased if proofing 
takes place in the early stages of policy formation and is followed by ‘(...) an ongoing 
series of checks and interventions.’39 It is perhaps unsurprising that the reality falls 
short of this ideal. Due to limited resources and time constraints, screening methods are 
commonly used to prioritise what ‘needs’ to be equality proofed. Although it does not 
appear that any ‘official’ screening methods exist in Britain, it seems likely that a degree 
of filtering occurred/occurs40 through the requirement that public authorities pay ‘due 
regard’ to the promotion of equality and the potential for discrimination. The Scottish 
Code of Practice for the GED explained that ‘due regard’ comprises the elements of 
‘proportionality’ and ‘relevance’, stating that ‘[i]n practice, this principle will mean 
public authorities should prioritise action to address the most significant gender 
inequalities within their remit.’41 The Equality Act 2010 does not remove the uncertainty 
surrounding what constitutes ‘due regard’ and concern has recently been expressed 
                                               
37 ibid. The report also contains examples of the types of questions that may be asked in the process of 
assessing whether a particular law or policy has relevance to gender. One such example (outlined on pgs. 
8-9) is the Dutch analytical tool SMART (Simple Method to Assess the Relevance of policies to gender) 
which is comprised of two questions: ‘1. Is the policy proposal directed at one or more target groups? 
Will it affect the daily life of part(s) of the population? 2. Are there differences between women and men 
in the field of the policy proposal (in respect of rights, resources, representation, values and norms related 
to gender?’ 
38 Equality proofing can be conducted by a variety of public servants, including ‘(...) policy makers, 
equality experts within departments, specialist equality units, Bill teams including instructing officers 
and drafters, statutory equality agencies, parliamentary committees and external experts.’ ibid 6.   
39 ibid 7.  
40 As noted above, the new legislation relating to the public sector duty also uses the term ‘due regard.’  
41 Equality & Human Rights Commission (Scotland) (n 29) 16.     
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over the vague and non-specific nature of the term.42 Although some guidance can be 
found in case law,43 to date there is no official code or guidance providing clear 
instructions to public authorities on this issue, meaning that those subject to the public 
sector duty, as well as the courts, have a degree of discretion as to what is prioritised.   
While prioritisation is certainly understandable, there is a risk that the 
fundamental purpose of mainstreaming is undermined through screening or filtering 
processes. As MacKay and Bilton note, screening means that legislation or policy that 
appears ‘gender neutral’ or does not have obvious implications for gender equality will 
be screened out, despite the fact that it might have considerable gendered 
implications.44 This goes against the very ethos of gender ‘mainstreaming’. The all-
embracing demands of GM might also mean that mainstreaming tools such as equality 
proofing are employed in a routine, essentially meaningless fashion, with those 
responsible for proofing adopting a ‘tick-box’ mentality. Finally, it is worth bearing in 
mind that all UK legislation must, at a minimum, comply with anti-discrimination, 
equality and human rights legislation, a fact that might lead some law-makers to 
conclude that sufficient equality proofing has already occurred, or will occur in the 
future, thereby deterring further analysis. All of the above factors cast doubt over the 
true value of equality proofing.                   
Difficulties relating to the systematic implementation of equality proofing mirror 
the broader difficulties with GM that are well-reported in mainstreaming literature. In 
her analysis of an EU-funded research project (EQUAPOL) that examined how gender 
is being mainstreamed in eight European countries,45 Daly reported enormous disparity 
and fragmentation in approaches to mainstreaming, concluding that the ‘(...) “common 
core” to gender mainstreaming in action across countries (…) lies in the tendency to 
apply the approach in a technocratic way and to be non-systemic in compass.’46 Other 
mainstreaming commentators paint a similar picture with respect to difficulties with 
implementation. While Hankivsky claims that ‘GM’s promise (…) has not been realized 
in any jurisdiction or in any area of public policy’,47 Squires has endorsed the view that 
‘(...) many countries and organizations adopt mainstreaming in name only’.48 Recently, 
                                               
42 In a recent lecture, Justice Sales said the following: ‘The statute does not give us much information 
about that [what is ‘due regard’], other than again in very general terms in section 149(3). The practical 
effect of the combination of a very wide range of application for the duty across all public functions and a 
very abstract formulation of what has to be done means that the burden of spelling out the practical 
content of the duty devolves to the courts.’  Cited in Pyper (n 33) 7. 
43 ibid.  See, e.g., R (Brown) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and another (n 33).  
44 Mackay & Bilton, Equality Proofing Procedures in Drafting Legislation (n 32) 8.  
45 Daly (n 19) 434. The countries were Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom.   
46 ibid 433.   
47 Hankivsky (n 9) 981.   
48 J Squires, The New Politics of Gender Equality (Palgrave 2007) 73.  Here, Squires concludes: ‘The 
inconsistent and unenthusiastic application of mainstreaming may be symptomatic of its derivation in 
institutions beyond the nation-state, meaning that the strategy lacks the necessary internal advocates, 
fails to mesh with existing policy priorities or institutional structures, or becomes interpreted in ways 
which resonate with national priorities, norms and structures, but which limit its envisaged potential.’    
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there have even been signs of a movement away from GM in the EU, leading some to 
declare a state of ‘crisis’.49 With this in mind, David Cameron’s view that EIAs - which 
as noted above form part of the proofing procedure encouraged by mainstreaming - are 
nothing more than ‘bureaucratic rubbish’50 does not seem quite so extreme. As with 
mainstreaming generally, there is no available evidence to support the view that impact 
assessments alone will deliver practical improvement to the lives of those with protected 
characteristics. The research conclusions of MacKay and Bilton support this view:51 
 
Whilst formal requirements to include statements about gender or other equality 
impact assessments in Memoranda for Cabinet are seen as desirable, they are not 
seen as sufficient to ensure effective integration of such considerations in 
legislative proposals. If these requirements are not backed up by mainstreaming 
systems, training, resources, good working relationships and political will they 
are seen as symbolic rather than resulting in changes outcomes. 
 
Nevertheless, it is suggested here that the outright axing of equality impact assessments 
is overly hasty, out of step with the approach taken in other EU and Commonwealth 
countries and sends the wrong message about the government’s commitment to 
equality. After all, it seems clear that the difficulties with EIAs pertain to their 
implementation and effectiveness, as opposed to the reasoning and values 
underpinning their existence. The decision to outright abandon impact assessments, 
rather than to dedicate more energy and resources into creating a culture in which 
mainstreaming is valued and supported, has therefore been criticised. Former shadow 
equalities minister, Yvette Cooper, raised concerns about axing impact assessments at a 
time when ‘(...) women are being hit much harder than men with low-income working 
families and disabled families losing out badly’,52 accusing the prime minister of 
removing ‘(...) any requirement for the public sector to even think about equality’ and of 
having a ‘personal blind spot on women.’53 Even if there is not yet available evidence 
pointing to a direct correlation between impact assessments and measurable equality 
outcomes, it is argued here that EIAs (and equality proofing generally) are part and 
parcel of fair, transparent and responsible law-making procedures that define a 
democratic state. Even if a degree of bureaucracy is involved, this is preferable to 
placing the burden on already over-worked public servants to judge when equality 
concerns are relevant and worthy of further analysis.      
Although lack of political will may go some way to explaining the lack of 
effectiveness with respect to equality proofing procedures in Britain, it is important not 
the lose sight of the fact that the failure of mainstreaming is a universal problem, even 
in countries such as Canada and Sweden where there is strong political support and 
                                               
49 Bendl & Schmit (n 12) 364.   
50 Mulholland (n 6).   
51 MacKay & Bilton, Equality Proofing Procedures in Drafting Legislation (n 32) 41.   
52 Mulholland (n 6). 
53 ibid. 
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clear proofing guidelines and procedures in everyday use.54 The fact that there is still 
ambiguity as to exactly what GM entails has prompted deep reflection on the exact 
meaning of the terms ‘gender’, ‘mainstreaming’ and ‘equality’, as well as on the 
theoretical underpinnings of GM. Implementation issues have also triggered debate 
about how to ‘reinvigorate’ GM, with many arguing for a more diversity-focused 
concept of mainstreaming. As noted earlier in this article, the new public sector equality 
duty in the Equality Act 2010 more closely conforms to a diversity model of 
mainstreaming than the previous individual equality duties. The remainder of this 
article assesses the significance of this change, again using insights from mainstreaming 
literature.  
 
 
4. Diversity Mainstreaming & The Equality Act 2010 
 
A. The Shift Towards ‘Diversity’ or ‘Equality’ Mainstreaming 
 
Although the former specific public sector equality duties relating to gender, race and 
disability were presented as powerful, revolutionary, tools at the time of their 
introduction, they were promptly criticised on grounds of inadequacy. From a 
conceptual standpoint, the principal critique was that these distinct duties reflected a 
narrow understanding of inequality, one that required individuals to identify with only 
one homogenous group in order to pursue a case of discrimination, even if those 
individuals had experienced discrimination on multiple levels.55 For example, a black 
disabled woman would have had to choose the ground on which she wanted to pursue a 
claim, when in reality the discrimination might have been triggered by the intersection 
of her different disadvantages.56 As Bagihole explains in some detail, UK statistics show 
that social inequality is experienced in complex ways. For example, while disabled men 
and women experience higher levels of unemployment compared to those who are not 
disabled, disabled women are less likely to be employed than disabled men.57 The fact 
that Muslim women suffer high levels of economic disadvantage compared with both 
women and men in different religious groups58 also serves as evidence of ‘(…) diverse 
and intersectional (in)equality between differentiations and communities, and 
polarization within each.’59 
Numerous mainstreaming commentators have therefore drawn attention to the 
difficulties with equality strategies that ‘(...) look at gender equality in isolation from 
                                               
54 See generally MacKay & Bilton, Equality Proofing Procedures in Drafting Legislation (n 32).   
55 B Bagilhole, ‘Equal Opportunities and Diversity Policies’ (2010) 27 Canadian Journal of Administrative 
Sciences 263, 263. 
56 ibid.  
57 ibid 265. 
58 ibid. 
59 ibid. 
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other forms of equality’,60 calling for equality strategies that are responsive to diverse 
forms of inequality, both between and apart from men and women. Hankivsky has 
presented a strong case for reconceptualising GM to be more diversity-focused, arguing 
that ‘(...) GM invokes a liberal concept of an abstract woman’61 that ‘(...) tends to 
concentrate on differences between men and women, treating each gender as a unitary, 
one dimensional category of analysis’62 in a way that nourishes ‘(...) fairly crude 
distinctions between women and men.’63 As with GM theory as a whole, these claims 
draw heavily on the work of some feminist writers who have taken opposition to the 
notion that all women share the same ‘voice’, needs, problems and experiences,64 and 
have popularised the term ‘intersectionality’.65   
Since the mid-2000s, therefore, calls to recognise and respond to plural, 
intersecting forms of inequality have gained in frequency and encouraged a widespread 
shift towards what is commonly termed ‘diversity’ or ‘equality’ mainstreaming. As 
Bacchi and Eveline note, the language of diversity has been embraced by the EU, as well 
as by legal international organisations, including the United Nations and the World 
Bank.66 The introduction of the unitary public sector equality duty in the Equality Act 
2010 is the legal manifestation of this shift in Scotland and England and Wales. 
However it was the establishment of the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
(EHRC) three years prior to this Act that clearly marked the adoption of a ‘single 
equality approach’ in Britain.67 While it is almost impossible to criticise the reasoning 
behind the extension of equality protection to other disadvantaged groups, praise for 
Britain’s new single equality approach has not been universal. This article now 
highlights several unintended consequences that have the potential to undermine the 
transformative potential of the new equality approach embodied in the public sector 
equality duty. 
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B. The Public Sector Equality Duty: Too Much, Too Early? 
 
In presenting her case for ‘diversity’ mainstreaming, Hankivsky makes the following 
claim:68 
 
(...) diversity mainstreaming allows for a more complex and dynamic 
understanding of equality and social justice, because the contours and compound 
effects of discrimination that women experience can be captured and the 
invisibility or marginalization of difference is no longer an option.  
 
Hankivsky is thus of the view that ‘diversity’ mainstreaming creates an environment 
that is more responsive to more women’s needs. There is a strong argument, however, 
that the opposite is true in practice; that the requirement that public authorities evaluate 
the equality impact of law and policy on numerous grounds may lead to gender 
equality ‘losing out’ in the ‘milieu of diversity.’69 Several mainstreaming commentators 
have voiced concern along these lines. In their analysis of the reform of European 
employment strategy, for example, Fagan, Grimshaw and Rubery argue that gender 
mainstreaming and gender equality objectives have been ‘subordinated’ following the 
removal of gender equality guidelines.70 Although the new public sector equality duty 
does not remove the duty on public authorities to take gender issues into account,71 it is 
possible to argue that the new duty obscures gender considerations to a certain extent 
and removes them from the forefront of the mind of law and policy makers. This is not 
to argue that gender is somehow more important or more worthy of attention than 
other protected characteristics, but simply that the generic equality analysis approach, 
encouraged by the Equality Act 2010, carries the risk of ‘[d]ilution and blandless’.72   
 There are other potential downfalls associated with the UK’s new approach to 
equality. Verloo has helpfully identified three basic difficulties relating to the EU’s 
movement towards a multiple inequalities approach that are also relevant to immediate 
discussion: ‘(…) the assumed similarity of inequalities, the need for structural 
approaches and the political competition between inequalities’.73 The first concern 
stems from the way that single equality instruments (e.g. the Equality Act 2010) list 
inequalities together in a way that suggests that all forms of inequality are alike and 
‘necessitate similar policies.’74 The listing approach in the UK thus has the potential to 
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obscure key differences with respect to inequality on grounds of age, disability, gender 
reassignment, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual 
orientation and indeed the cultural and spatial variation in how these inequalities are 
experienced.  
The second concern identified by Verloo is that single equality instruments 
perpetuate an individualistic approach that is insufficient to deal effectively with 
structural disadvantage. To tie this to the discussion about the public sector equality 
duty, this means that the legal change represented in the Equality Act is not enough: 
that it must be accompanied by ‘(...) strategies at the level of structures and 
institutions’.75 In other words, the shift to ‘equality’ or ‘diversity’ mainstreaming has to 
occur in practice at an institutional level as well as in theory. Verloo emphasises that the 
adoption of ‘equality’ or ‘diversity’ cannot simply involve adapting current tools of 
gender mainstreaming. Rather,76  
 
[if] intersectionality is at work in strategies against inequalities, then new and 
more comprehensive analytical methods are needed and methods of education, 
training and consultation will have to be rethought.          
 
Although the new EHRC in Britain ‘(...) requires an approach that acknowledges 
diversity and intersectionality’77 more research is required to determine whether this 
approach is being applied in practice. However, the fact that current EHRC guidelines 
for public authorities78 do not even make reference to the term ‘intersectionality’ does 
little to instil confidence that this is the case. In sum, given the theoretical complexity 
and contestation surrounding concepts of intersectionality, difference and diversity79 it 
is possible to argue that the attempt to ‘blend’ equality analysis has happened too 
quickly, without full appreciation of what these terms mean in theory or practice; the 
differences between forms of inequality; how they intersect with one another; and what 
tools are required to ensure that these diverse and intersecting equality concerns are 
effectively and sophisticatedly integrated into law and policy making. Competition 
between different forms of inequality is the third potential downfall to a single equality 
duty that lists multiple protected characteristics. In essence, the concern here is that 
some equality issues will be paid more attention than others, creating something that 
resembles a ‘hierarchy of inequalities’. This competition, according to Verloo, is ‘(...) 
fuelled by the specific nature of current policies’ and the political environment at a 
particular point in time.  Gender or disability concerns, for example, could slip down 
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the ‘hierarchy’ during a moment of heightened political awareness about racial 
inequality, and thus be less likely to be integrated into law and policy. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
  
One of the principal aims of the Equality Act 2010 was to ‘harmonise’ and ‘simplify’80 
Britain’s equality law framework through the creation of a single equality duty covering 
eight protected characteristics. While the extension of equality protection is welcome 
and in line with developments elsewhere, this article set out to demonstrate that the 
background and conceptual underpinning to this fundamental change is far from 
simple. The new public sector duty not only replaces concerns about inadequate 
protection with concerns about dilution, vagueness, competition and the adequate 
recognition of intersectionality, but requires law and policy makers to broaden their 
equality-sensitive gaze at a time when public resources are incredibly stretched. From 
the perspective of those concerned with the advancement of gender equality in law and 
policy making, there is a real risk that gender concerns will be overshadowed or 
deprioritised and that the ethos of gender mainstreaming will be simultaneously 
undermined.   
To be clear, the movement towards a more ‘diversity’ or ‘equality’ focused 
conception of mainstreaming conception is a step in the right direction. There are few 
feminists or gender mainstreaming commentators who would deny this, particularly 
given that ‘diversity’ or ‘equality’ mainstreaming is, at least in theory, capable of 
responding to the needs of more women. The point to emphasise, however, is that this 
new form of mainstreaming will only live up to its conceptual expectations if those 
responsible for its implementation have a robust understanding of intersectionality, 
awareness of potential unintended consequences and access to the proper assessment 
tools. Unfortunately, any hope that this will occur is dampened by the message coming 
from the top that equality impact assessment is readily dispensable.       
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